A rich literature has developed focusing on the efficacy of peacekeeping operations (PKOs) in a temporal sense-asking whether the periods following a deployment are more peaceful or not. We know less about the efficacy of PKOs in a spatial sense. Can peacekeeping shape the geographic dispersion of particular episodes of violence? We posit that PKOs can contain conflict by decreasing the tactical advantage of mobility for the rebels, by obstructing the movement of armed actors, and by altering the ability for governments to seek and confront rebel actors. We investigate the observable implications using georeferenced conflict polygons from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program's (UCDP) Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED). Our findings confirm that peacekeeping operations tend to decrease movement in the conflict polygons, especially when robust forces are deployed and when rebel groups have strong ethnic ties. Our findings, on the one hand, imply that peacekeeping operations reduce the geographic scope of violence. On the other hand, peacekeeping operations may allow nonstate actors to gain strength and legitimacy, and thus constitute an even greater future threat to the state if some form of accord is not reached.
The expansion of UN peacekeeping activities after the Cold War has generated considerable optimism about its ability to promote peace. Some observers have credited international peacekeeping activities as a major factor behind the observed decline of war (Goldstein 2011) . Some scholarship has shown that, on average, peacekeeping does well to reduce the risk of recurrent violence (Diehl, Reifschneider, and Hensel 1996; Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2008; Gilligan and Sergenti 2008; Walter 2002) , shorten conflict durations (Beardsley 2014; Gilligan and Sergenti 2008) , and attenuate the severity of hostilities (Hultman 2010; Shannon 2013, 2014) . Peacekeeping success, however, can be defined on even more dimensions (Diehl and Druckman 2010);  and, presumably, peacekeeping missions will do better on some of these dimensions than others. Moreover, there is a great deal of variation in how well peacekeeping fares, dependent upon mission characteristics. To be sure, failures of peacekeeping to improve security remain easy to find, and studies that have taken a qualitative look across peacekeeping missions have provided an important context to aid in understanding the merits (and limitations) of peacekeeping in advancing the prospects for peace in (and between) war-torn countries (Diehl 1994; Howard 2008; Paris 2004) . The quantitative literature has also found that peacekeeping is limited in improving human rights (Murdie and Davis 2010) , shortening periods of violence (Gilligan and Sergenti 2008) , and reducing rebel violence against civilians (Hultman 2010) .
Existing work has focused on how peacekeeping promotes peace within the countries affected on a temporal dimension, assessing whether periods that follow the deployment of peacekeepers tend to be more peaceful. We have much less evidence, however, as to whether UN peacekeeping activities affect peace on a spatial dimension. Diehl and Druckman (2010) highlight the importance of thinking about the many different effects peacekeeping may have, including the geographic containment of conflict. Peacekeepers exist in space, and their presence plausibly affects the locations of conflict and peace, not solely their duration and severity. We lack, however, systematic assessments of how peacekeeping affects the geographic dispersion of conflict. Collier, Chauvet, and Hegre (2008) and Beardsley (2011) consider the potential for peacekeeping to diminish the spread of conflict across state borders, but existing work has not analyzed how peacekeeping impacts the mobility of conflict zones within the states where the peacekeepers are deployed.
Skepticism might be warranted in considering whether peacekeeping does much to alter the locations where armed conflict occurs, given limitations in capability and willingness to engage armed actors. Lessons from places such as Rwanda, Bosnia, Somalia, and Lebanon might suggest that PKOs will tend to stand aside and/or be withdrawn as armed actors mobilize, in order to keep peacekeepers out of the line of fire. However, Friis (2010) argues that peacekeeping and counterinsurgency (COIN) are starting to converge. If this is the case, then we might expect peacekeeping to lead to conflict displacement or increase the movement of conflict zones, as the deployment of international forces might mimic the strengthening of government forces and cause rebel groups to fight in disparate locations as a means of survival. Still another expectation emerges when considering that peacekeeping tends to impede the movement of transnational actors responsible for the contagion of conflict across state boundaries (Beardsley 2011) . PKOs appear to do well in preventing the spread of conflict across state boundaries, and it is possible that they also do well containing the spread of conflict within states.
The relationship between peacekeeping and the geographic orientation of conflict can help us better understand how peacekeeping relates to some of the underlying foundations of conflict. Recent research has emphasized the need to look at the local characteristics in conflict zones to evaluate claims about possible motives and opportunities for conflict (Buhaug and Rød 2006; Buhaug, Cederman, and Rød 2008; Cederman, Buhaug and Rød 2009; Cederman and Gleditsch 2009; Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011; Cunningham and Weidmann 2010; Hegre, Østby, and Raleigh 2009; Raleigh and Hegre 2009; Weidmann 2009 Weidmann , 2011 Weidmann and Ward 2010; Zhukov 2012) . This developing literature has contributed to a growing understanding about the local roots of rebellion and insurgency. These existing studies, however, are limited in treating the conflict zones as fixed and invariant over the course of the conflicts. Yet, the UCDP GED data shows, significantly, that the movement of intrastate armed conflicts is pervasive. The data, described below, show: (i) on average 45% (by both mean and median) of the armed conflict areas in a given year overlap with the conflict area in the previous year, and (ii) 25% of the annual conflict areas have virtually no overlap with those in the previous year.
Conflict zones can and do change considerably over the course of the hostilities. A number of studies have considered the potential for intrastate conflict to spread between countries (Braithwaite 2010; Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008; Salehyan 2009; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006) . Moreover, some recent work has analyzed the spread of conflict event locations using more geographically disaggregated information, examining how this relates to various characteristics of conflicts and the antagonists (Beardsley, Gleditsch, and Lo ND; Schutte and Weidmann 2011; Zhukov 2012) . However, to date, research has not had much to say about the role of third parties in affecting the patterns of movement in conflict areas.
Not only is the movement of conflict zones pervasive and thus an interesting phenomenon to study in its own right, but conflict movement also helps us understand other phenomena such as the humanitarian footprint of conflicts-given that many victims of intrastate violence are noncombatants-and the means by which nonstate actors survive and extract resources in the face of COIN efforts. We thus focus on conflict containment as an important yet understudied outcome of peacekeeping activity. We note, however, that containment in and of itself should not be equated with peacekeeping "success" because containment can in some cases be undesirable, as when it contributes to longer conflict and impunity for the actors committing atrocities or negotiating in bad faith. Diehl and Druckman (2010) also note that in many cases peacekeeping "success" in confronting armed actors can entail the movement of armed hostilities (to where peacekeepers are not deployed) and that such movement does not necessarily imply the failure of peacekeeping operations in achieving their mandated goals. We return to the potential positive and negative implications of containment below.
A Motivating Example: JEM and UNAMID
Consider, for example, the case of the African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). The Darfur conflict is a prominent case of an ongoing conflict generating calls for international responses to stop the conflict or at least reduce the level of violence. The conflict reached its peak intensity over the period [2003] [2004] [2005] In what follows, we begin by laying out a theory explaining variation in the movement of conflict zones. We then consider how peacekeeping can shape those dynamics, and we argue that peacekeeping is situated for conflict containment, especially when the PKO force is large, the rebel forces are much weaker than the government forces, and the rebel group has strong local ethnic ties. We then describe our research design to empirically investigate the observable implications and report the findings.
Theory

Actor Incentives
Before turning to how peacekeeping might affect the geographic dispersion of violence, we need to understand why conflict tends to be so mobile in the first place. We argue that, although rebels might benefit from being stationary, certain environments make it more likely that they fight in varied locations, out of both necessity and tactical choice (Beardsley, Gleditsch, and Lo ND) . Starting with why rebels can benefit from more enduring or stationary conflict zones, we posit that fighting in a consistent theater and better defined home ground can enable groups to gain more local support or establish stronger control. In the same vein as Mancur Olson's (1993; 2000) allegory of roving and stationary bandits, armed actors that are able to establish consistent hierarchy can come to rule with legitimate authority rather than through expensive brute force that is likely to face continued resistance.
Applied to the intrastate conflict context, rebel groups that stay localized-and, by implication, are more likely to fight in consistent locations-are better able to compete with the state as the side with legitimate authority and win local support.
Rebels, however, often have other incentives to fight in inconsistent theaters.
Fighting in diverse locations can help rebel groups evade government counterinsurgency efforts. That is, although rebel groups benefit from staying local, they are often forced to become mobile as a means to survive. Groups that are very weak relative to the government stand a high risk of simply being conclusively defeated if they try to fight the state in the same location or consistent theaters of combat. Staying mobile allows them to carry out typical guerilla tactics meant to hurt the state with less risk of complete defeat.
There is a long line of research attesting to how mobility in asymmetric warfare can help small groups defeat much stronger opponents ( Aside from staying mobile as a means of staying viable from a position of relative weakness, sometimes rebels are fighting over control of the state, rather than the autonomy of some ethnic homeland, and thus need to take the fight to varying locations so as to secure a wider base of support. Although such guerrilla warfare by itself cannot overthrow the government, sustained fighting activity can advertise the group's presence and convert people to the rebels' cause, and in turn, help the movement grow to a point where it can eventually oppose the government. And, once the rebels have the clear upper hand, the conflict is likely to be even more mobile as they strike toward the capital or other strategic locations in the state. Moreover, when rebel groups lack strong ethnic ties to a particular group, the establishment of local hierarchy is not likely to be as beneficial as when it can more easily claim to be the champion of a well-defined segment of the population.
On the other side, the government has an incentive to prevent rebels from setting up local strongholds, from which the rebels can establish position and drum up anti-regime sentiment among their core constituency. Government counterinsurgency strategies typically advocate attacks against rebel strongholds to force rebels to flee or fight under less favorable circumstances (not of their own choosing), and also target locations crucial to territorial control, attempting to turn the civilians in rebel strongholds against the rebels (Galula 1964; Paul, Clarke, Grill, and Dunigan 2013; Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004 incentive to strike at rebel strongholds at the earliest opportunity, even if it means having to subsequently cover larger areas and displacing the conflict zones. Containment may be cheaper in the short run, but it also ensures that the rebel groups remain viable, with the opportunity to compete with the state as the legitimate sovereign of a particular territory.
The degree to which conflicts move will thus depend on the relative strength of the combatants and the potential of the rebel groups for the establishment of legitimate authority over certain pockets of the local population. Earlier work confirms that conflict zones are more mobile when rebel groups are relatively much weaker than government forces and when rebel groups do not claim to be fighting for control over an ethnic homeland (Beardsley, Gleditsch and Lo ND) . This earlier work, however, does not consider the potential role that third parties can play in shaping these incentives for battles to occur in different locations. Specifically, it is unclear if peacekeeping tends to bolster the strength of the state and thus lead to an even greater spread of conflict, or if the peacekeepers might disrupt the incentives for both state and nonstate actors to fight in varied locations. effect on the movement of conflict theaters, it will tend to contain rather than displace.
Peacekeeping and Conflict Mobility
If peacekeepers are not well oriented toward offensive military action, then it is doubtful that peacekeeping forces will have much of a displacement effect. Peacekeepers do not pose to rebel groups anything like the existential threat that government forces pose (which can keep weaker rebel groups on the move for survival). The limitations of military engagement, however, do not mean that peacekeepers cannot affect conflict zone movements by containing them.
We posit that peacekeeping can indeed limit the geographic movement of armed hostilities between government and rebel forces through three mechanisms. First, the monitoring that peacekeeping provides can decrease the ability for armed contingents of any side to move undetected. Even when PKOs do not involve strong mandates or a substantial number of boots on the ground, they are responsible for monitoring the activity of the armed protagonists and to report. The deployment of more resources to watch movements decreases any informational advantage that mobile actors hope to exploit. If keeping mobile becomes marginally less beneficial, then stationarity and consistency in battle location become more likely alternatives.
As a second mechanism, peacekeepers can effectively get in the way of movement, by being active on major road arteries and establishing protected areas. Armed actors will be hesitant to forcefully remove such obstacles for a number of reasons. By threatening peacekeeping forces, the armed actors risk a firefight with peacekeepers, who may be restrained from acting offensively but certainly can act defensively. Moreover, since many intrastate conflicts are competitions for legitimacy, actors (both state and nonstate) may find it counterproductive to offend the international community or to allow their opponent to credibly portray them as intransigent and/or uninterested in pursuing peaceful alternatives.
International condemnation could very well lead toward sanctions and a denial of recognition of their claims for sovereignty.
Third, and related to the above, PKOs can decrease the willingness of government forces to use heavy-handed tactics to clear areas of rebels and their supporters. If indiscriminate violence is more likely to bring international condemnation and sanctions when done under the watch of PKOs, then states will be less likely to resort to such tactics as a means to keep rebels from establishing control of specific localities when PKOs are deployed. In these cases, the PKOs provide a type of protection, unintentional or not, behind which rebels are freer to set down strong local roots and face less need to stay mobile as a survival tactic. We return later to this potential implication: that PKOs often help protect nonstate actors from government forces.
Our argument is thus that peacekeeping forces can affect the geographic spread of intrastate conflict, primarily through containment. Again reflecting on the limitations of PKO mandates and operations, we also qualify our expectations about when containment is likely. First, and most straightforward, we expect peacekeeping missions to have greater containment effects as their force sizes increase. PKOs will be better able to monitor when they can send out more patrols. Moreover, peacekeepers will be better able to impede the progress of the armed actors when there are more personnel. Interestingly, Ruggeri, Gizelis, and Dorussen (2013) find that rebel cooperation with PKOs is greater with larger missions,
suggesting that large PKOs could play a protective role against government pursuit of rebels and thus decrease the need for the rebels to stay mobile for survival.
Second, we expect that peacekeepers will perform considerably better in containing the hostilities between government forces and weak rebels than in containing those involving stronger rebel movements. Stronger groups are those that do not have as much need to move for survival because they can better contend against government incursions than weaker actors. This means that stronger rebel groups will not find monitoring by peacekeeping forces as great a threat to their viability. Thus, when stronger groups wish to move, the peacekeepers are less problematic. Smaller groups, however, will be affected by the additional monitoring that PKOs provide-as their ability to stay safe while moving is likely compromised (because the PKOs can substantially reduce the informational advantage that smaller groups tend to exploit by staying mobile). Moreover, Ruggeri, Gizelis, and Dorussen (2013) also find that weak rebel groups are more likely to cooperate with UN peacekeeping missions, again suggesting the possibility of a protective role in which PKOs are oriented toward reducing the incentives for weak groups to move in response to government threats.
Third, we contend that PKOs will have a greater containment effect when groups are fighting for an ethnic homeland. The extent, albeit sometimes limited, to which the peacekeepers can reduce the aggressiveness of the government forces toward the nonstate armed actors will directly reduce the movement of clashes between rebels and government as the rebels feel more protected from threats and persecution at the hands of the government. 
Research Design
We test these expectations on a data set of annual dyadic civil-war observations. More specifically, we use conflict dyad polygons from the UCDP GED data (Croicu and Sundberg 2012) . 4 We choose to use annual polygons rather than individual geographical grid cells within conflicts or shorter time periods since we lack more disaggregated information for our key explanatory variables related to peacekeeping deployments, relative rebel strength, and ethnic claims. The GED data comprise georeferenced event data of battles within armed conflicts, where an armed conflict has at least 25 battle-related fatalities per year. The current data are limited to Africa. From the individual event data, the GED data estimate georeferenced polygons, based on calculations of the convex hull of the individual battles, to 4 We chose to use the GED data instead of other alternatives such as the Armed 
Modeling Conflict Zone Movement
We choose to measure the year-on-year movement in conflict zones by calculating the 5 The GED data exclude certain isolated outliers that would lead to unreasonably defined or overly large conflict polygons. Events are considered outliers for defining polygons if they alone would account for more than 20% of the area and decrease the density of the data points in the polygon by more than 20%, and the events account for less than 5% of the total number of events and deaths in the conflict (Croicu and Sundberg 2012, 9 ).
percentage of overlap in the current year's conflict zone area with the previous year's conflict zone area. When the current area is completely contained within the previous area, this measure equals 1. When the current area does not intersect with the previous area, the measure equals 0.
With a dependent variable that is bounded by 0 and 1, we estimate the regression model for proportions suggested by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) , in essence a general linear model (GLM) with a logit transformation of the response. This allows us to see how the covariates affect the proportion of overlap between subsequent conflict zones, transformed along a logistic "S" curve. We report standard errors that are robust to clustering on each country, as multiple conflicts and polygons in the same country are likely to share a number of unobserved characteristics and thus have correlated errors.
Explanatory and Conditioning Variables
We choose a few different measures of the presence of a peacekeeping force in a country. Kathman (2013) . 9 The advantage of this latter measure is that it is more precise in both the size of the mission and the function of the personnel, even though it only covers the UN missions.
Our measure of relative rebel weakness is coded in the nonstate actor data (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009 ) as a categorical measure of relative rebel strength, based on a number of factors including troop sizes and fighting capacity. While most intrastate conflicts involve rebels that are weaker than the government, we are interested in cases in which they are extremely disadvantaged and have to rely on flight for survival. As a result, we code a dummy variable for whether this variable indicates that the rebels are much weaker than the government. This variable, as well as all others that can change from year to year in a conflict, is lagged one year because the dependent variable is dates of the operations reflected the 2005-2010 realities, and also adding information for the missions in Chad (MINURCAT), Burundi (BINUB) and Somalia (AMISOM).
8 Beardsley (2011) uses the same measure. About 25% of the observations with a peacekeeping mission have less than 1000 military personnel. 9 In countries with multiple missions, we first added across the missions for each month before calculating the maximum for the year.
movement from the previous year to the current year and there is a potential for simultaneity bias without the lags.
Rebel aims to fight for an ethnic homeland are measured based on the ACD2EPR data, which link the actors in the Uppsala Armed Conflict Data to the ethnic groups in the Ethnic Power Relations data (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; Wucherpfennig, Metternich, Cederman, and Gleditsch 2012) . The specific measure that we use is a dichotomous coding of whether the rebel group makes a claim to fight for the interests of a particular ethnic group.
10
Control Variables
We control for factors that are likely associated with the tendency for conflict to spread because it is possible that the UN is more likely to authorize peacekeeping missions to the countries that have a greater need for containment. In addition to relative rebel weakness and rebel aims, our earlier work has shown that outside military support can strongly affect the propensity for conflict zones to move (Beardsley, Gleditsch, and Lo ND) . We thus include a measure of external support from the UCDP External Support Data (Högbladh, Pettersson, and Themnér 2011) . Specifically, we use whether there was direct military participation as a warring party by external actors for the rebel side in each government-rebel dyad. We also control for the severity of the hostilities-high levels of escalation could relate to changing conflict zones, but we are explaining movement separate from levels of escalation. We specifically include the estimated number of battle deaths related to government-rebel 10 The data also allow for links based on recruitment from specific ethnic groups without explicit claims, but we do not consider this here.
fighting from the UCDP GED data. 11 Since conflicts in the mountains face geographical constraints in the potential to spread, we also control for the mean elevation of the conflict polygons. Similarly, we control for the percent of the conflict-area polygons that encompass urban space, from the Global Rural-Urban Mapping Project (GRUMP) data (GRUMP 2011), because the spread of conflict is likely to play out differently in urban and rural environments. We also include the number of distinct ethnic-group homelands encompassed by the polygons, using the ethnic-group settlement polygons from the GeoEPR data (Wucherpfennig, Weidman, Girardin, Cederman, and Wimmer 2011) , because ethnic fractionalization likely shapes the aims of the rebel groups while also impacting the ability for conflict to spread. The area of the country that is the primary location of the conflict is also included in the models because borders can-although they often fail in this regardimpede the movement of conflict such that larger countries simply have more real estate for conflict to diffuse.
We also control for two characteristics about the conflict zones that are important in establishing the construct validity of our dependent variable-specifically, that it is measuring battle location movements and not simply reflecting the overall size of the conflict or the number of battles. Each model includes the areas of the polygons that define the conflict zones. The size of the conflict zone affects the expected overlap in consecutive polygons, as the new area in a larger conflict will have to be much greater in order to register the same percentage overlap as smaller conflicts. 12 Related, we also control for the number 11 We use the natural log of this variable because a slight increase in fatalities is less likely to be meaningful in establishing the severity of violence in the bloodiest conflicts. 12 We transform the conflict area variable by taking the natural log because each additional square kilometer is likely to matter much less when the conflict area is already of GED events used to comprise each polygon because these will affect the shape of the polygons formed and how well defined these are with respect to individual events. Polygon shape will have some bearing on the extent to which conflict polygons are likely to move in the next period, as shapes with fewer vertices are likely to be more prone to large shifts as battle locations come and go from year to year.
Finally, we control for two variables that relate to the phase of conflict because peacekeeping, almost by definition, tends to deploy during phases of conflict abatement which might also be associated with less active armed actors. So, comparing observations with peacekeeping to observations without peacekeeping risks comparing the types of phases that tend to experience peacekeeping (and that happen to experience less conflict zone movement) to those that do not typically experience peacekeeping (and that happen to involve more mobile actors). To address this potential, we control for the duration of the conflict in years and the year-on-year change in conflict area. The former directly controls for the timing of any PKOs in the lifetime of the conflict; the latter controls for whether or not the conflict has recently been winding down in scope or widening.
While such control variables attempt to reduce some concerns for endogeneity bias that would arise if the PKO deployments were a function of the potential for conflict zones to be mobile, questions of causal identification remain because of the possibility that we are missing unobserved, or indeed unobservable, processes. We thus run regression models to see if lagged movement can adequately explain peacekeeping deployments and find that it does not. We also note, following Fortna (2008) , Schmidt (2012), Gilligan and Sergenti (2008) , and Gilligan and Stedman (2003) that PKOs are more likely to deploy to the more intractable conflicts that pose the greatest threats to international stability. This large than when the conflict area is more confined.
implies that PKOs are more likely to deploy to those conflicts that are less likely to stay contained. Thus, if there is endogeneity bias, it is most likely against finding that PKOs contain conflict, making any findings that PKOs do contain all the more significant.
Results
The results from the GLM estimation confirm many of the expectations. Table 1 observer personnel is not statistically significant, while the estimated effect of police personnel is, interestingly, statistically significant and negative. That is, more police personnel tend to be associated with greater displacement, not containment, of conflict zones.
The failure to find a positive relationship between police personnel and conflict containment may be due to the many problems with the UN's ability to facilitate policing matters during peacekeeping, an area which Durch and England (2010, 33) note "has faced chronic challenges." However, although police forces may not be an appropriate response to armed conflict and fail to have much effect on the activities of armed nonstate actors, it is still unexpected that the relationship should be positive. Further investigation reveals that much of the effect appears to stem from the SLM/A in Sudan in 2010, when there was no overlap in the subsequent polygons and over 5000 police deployed. Dropping this single observation alone renders the estimate for the police coefficient statistically insignificant. Another possibility is that policing deployments closely reflect the underlying need for personnel, which is potentially a function of the conflict scope. We investigated the possibility that the positive containment findings related to troop deployments and/or negative containment findings related to police deployments are actually a product of reverse causality, where certain types of deployments are more or less likely depending on the propensity for movement. However, when we regressed troop and police personnel on lagged conflict movements, we found no statistically significant relationships in support of this. Table 2 present the results-Model 7 uses troop deployments and Model 8 uses police deployments as the dependent variables. We do not see evidence that police deploy to the conflicts that are quite mobile or that troops deploy to the conflicts that are less mobile.
Returning to the main results, Figure 3 shows the substantive effects (with 95% confidence intervals) of increases in troop and police personnel. Future research might better uncover why police personnel (if anything) seem to be associated with the displacement of conflict rather than its containment, and how police troops in peacekeeping can best be integrated with and complement military troops.
To see if peacekeeping tends to do better at containing weaker rebel groups, Model 4 includes an interaction term between the basic peacekeeping indicator and relative rebel weakness. The coefficient on the interaction term is statistically significant, and, when considering the constitutive terms, the interpretation is that peacekeeping has a modest containment effect when the rebel groups are not very weak, and peacekeeping does especially well to contain conflicts when the rebel groups are very weak. This estimate, however, relies on only four observations in which there is both peacekeeping and a very weak rebel group, and three of these observations come from the same conflict. As a robustness test, we use an alternative measure of relative strength, which is the ratio of rebel troop numbers to government troop numbers, based on the Non-State Actor data, supplemented with data from Wood (2010) and Correlates of War (COW) capabilities data on military personnel. 14 The results are presented in Model 5 and are not robust. We thus 14 We do not use this troop ration measure as our base measure because we lose a number of observations due to missing information in the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia.
cannot conclude with sufficient confidence that peacekeepers are better able to contain conflicts when the rebels are weak. Model 6 includes an interaction term between the basic peacekeeping indicator and whether the relevant rebel group has claimed to be fighting for a specific ethnic group. We expected peacekeeping to excel at containing such ethnically-oriented conflicts if the peacekeepers are able to reduce the incentives of the government forces to push the rebels out of consolidated locations. The findings confirm this expectation, as the interaction term is positive and statistically significant while the constitutive PKO term is statistically insignificant. Peacekeeping has more success containing conflicts fought against rebel groups claiming to be fighting for their ethnic homeland. Figure 4 shows the substantive effects (with 95% confidence intervals). We observe that the level of mobility in conflict zones is similar with and without peacekeeping for the conflicts in which the rebel groups do not make an ethnic claim. When they do, the conflict zones are more likely to be contained in the presence of a PKO. It is telling that larger missions, especially when there are many troops, have the starkest containment effect, while observers and police numbers do not associate strongly with containment. It appears that the mechanisms by which PKOs contain conflict are much more related to impeding armed-actor movement and deterring government forces from uprooting rebel groups than to the reduction of informational advantages through monitoring. That observers especially do not have a strong containment effect indicates that simply keeping an eye on the actors is not sufficient to change the spatial patterns of violence. Boots on the ground are needed to occupy space, obstruct actor movements, and perhaps maintain a credible enforcement threat.
More generally, one implication of our theory is that peacekeeping may be providing cover for rebel groups, which will seize upon the opportunity to gain strength and legitimacy while under the protection of international involvement. This is especially the case for those fighting for an ethnic homeland. Although most PKOs have some nominal government consent to their deployment, they can restrict major government hostilities from targeting rebel groups, which are often embedded within civilian communities. This can create a moral hazard in which the rebels take advantage of their relative security to gain in strength, sometimes through coercive means. Hultman (2010) finds that peace operations can actually increase rebel one-sided violence unless there are specific mandates to protect civilians. This supports the claim that PKOs can provide cover for rebel groups, although the implications for robust missions are more nuanced. More robust missions may help contain conflict and provide space for rebels to avoid the sting of government pursuit, but they can also limit civilian abuse at the hands of the rebels (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013) . Related, Greig and Diehl (2005) find that peacekeeping operations can decrease the incentives for actors to reach a sustainable settlement, in part because the costs of conflict are quite bearable while peacekeepers are in place. We similarly contend that peacekeeping might lead to the unintended, although often foreseen, consequence of entrenching the positions of the nonstate armed actors.
This brings us back to the question of whether conflict containment is a useful metric for peacekeeping success (Diehl and Druckman 2010) . From the standpoint of desiring peacekeeping to promote international stability, conflict containment can be desirable, especially in the short run. In the long run, however, it is possible that the protection of nonstate actors could allow intrastate struggles to fester. From the standpoint of desiring peacekeeping to reduce the humanitarian footprint of civil war, containment also sometimes faces a stark trade-off . The protection of some nonstate actors could place members of the local population, especially those loyal to the government, in the areas controlled by rebel groups at greater risk for abuse.
Understanding that conflict containment is a likely outcome from peacekeeping, even
if not a clear objective that would alone define success, does shed light on how to maximize the desired objectives. In terms of pursuing lasting stability, it is important that the international community enhances the incentives for diplomatic initiatives to move toward more permanent resolution, even and especially while peacekeepers are deployed and violence is temporarily muted. Global and regional actors with leverage over the parties must continue to move peace processes forward while peacekeepers bolster the security environment. In terms of improving the humanitarian dimensions of conflict, it is important that sufficient personnel are deployed to prevent armed actors from abusing noncombatants while under the cover of a peacekeeping mission. Our findings, combined with those from Hultman (2010) and Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon (2013) , suggest that undercommitted peacekeeping can endanger local populations, while more robust peacekeeping can both contain violence and protect those under control of the armed actors.
